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The extremely low accident rate for U.S air carriers relative to that of general aviation
(~1 and ~60/million flight hours respectively) partly reflects advanced airman
certification, more demanding recurrency training and stringent operational regulations.
However, whether such skillset/training/regulations translate into improved safety for
airline pilots operating in the general aviation environment is unknown and the aim of
this study.
Methods
Accidents (1998-2017) involving airline pilots and instrument-rated private pilots (PPL-
IFR) operating non-revenue light aircraft were identified from the NTSB accident
database. An online survey informed general aviation flight exposure for both pilot
cohorts. Statistics used proportion testing and Mann-Whitney U tests.
Results
In degraded visibility, 0 and 40% (     p=0.043) of fatal accidents involving airline and
PPL-IFR airmen were due to in-flight loss-of-control, respectively. For landing
accidents, airline pilots were under-represented for mishaps related to airspeed
mismanagement (p=0.036) relative to PPL-IFR but showed a dis-proportionate count
(2X) of ground loss-of-directional control accidents (p=0.009) the latter likely reflecting
a preference for tail-wheel aircraft. The proportion of FAA rule violation-related mishaps
by airline pilots was >2X (7 vs. 3%) that for PPL-IFR airmen. Moreover, airline pilots
showed a disproportionate (p=0.021) count of flights below legal minimum altitudes.
Not performing an official preflight weather briefing or intentionally operating in
instrument conditions without an IFR flight plan represented 43% of airline pilot
accidents involving FAA rule infractions.
Conclusions
These findings inform safety deficiencies for: (i) airline pilots, landing/ground operations
in tail-wheel aircraft and lack of 14CFR 91 familiarization regulations regarding
minimum operating altitudes and (ii) PPL-IFR airmen in-flight loss-of-control and poor
landing speed management.
Practical Applications
For PPL-IFR airmen, training/recurrency should focus on unusual attitude recovery and
managing approach speeds. Airline pilots should seek additional instructional time
regarding landing tail-wheel aircraft and become familiar with 14CFR 91 rules covering
minimum altitudes.
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 Introduction: The extremely low accident rate for U.S air carriers relative to that of general aviation (~1 
and ~60/million flight hours respectively) partly reflects advanced airman certification, more demanding 
recurrency training and stringent operational regulations. However, whether such skillset/training/regulations 
translate into improved safety for airline pilots operating in the general aviation environment is unknown and 
the aim of this study. Methods: Accidents (1998-2017) involving airline pilots and instrument-rated private 
pilots (PPL-IFR) operating non-revenue light aircraft were identified from the NTSB accident database. An 
online survey informed general aviation flight exposure for both pilot cohorts. Statistics used proportion testing 
and Mann-Whitney U tests. Results: In degraded visibility, 0 and 40% (χ2 p=0.043) of fatal accidents involving 
airline and PPL-IFR airmen were due to in-flight loss-of-control, respectively. For landing accidents, airline 
pilots were under-represented for mishaps related to airspeed mismanagement (p=0.036) relative to PPL-IFR 
but showed a dis-proportionate count (2X) of ground loss-of-directional control accidents (p=0.009) the latter 
likely reflecting a preference for tail-wheel aircraft. The proportion of FAA rule violation-related mishaps by 
airline pilots was >2X (7 vs. 3%) that for PPL-IFR airmen. Moreover, airline pilots showed a disproportionate 
(χ2 p=0.021) count of flights below legal minimum altitudes. Not performing an official preflight weather briefing 
or intentionally operating in instrument conditions without an IFR flight plan represented 43% of airline pilot 
accidents involving FAA rule infractions. Conclusions: These findings inform safety deficiencies for: (i) airline 
pilots, landing/ground operations in tail-wheel aircraft and lack of 14CFR 91 familiarization regulations 
regarding minimum operating altitudes and (ii) PPL-IFR airmen in-flight loss-of-control and poor landing speed 
management. Practical Applications: For PPL-IFR airmen, training/recurrency should focus on unusual 
attitude recovery and managing approach speeds. Airline pilots should seek additional instructional time 
regarding landing tail-wheel aircraft and become familiar with 14CFR 91 rules covering minimum altitudes.  
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 Civil aviation can be arbitrarily divided into (i) revenue-based transportation comprised mainly of air 
carrier operations utilizing transport-category aircraft (>12,500 lbs.) and (ii) general aviation employing light 
aircraft (<12,500 lbs.) [1]. While air carrier operations have, over the last few decades, boasted a stellar safety 
record [1], alas general aviation, despite a modest decrease in accident rate over most recent years, still 
shows a lackluster record with a >60 times higher accident (herein also referred to as mishaps) rate [1, 2]. 
 The discrepancy in safety between airline and general aviation operations probably reflects multiple 
factors. First is the advanced certification and recurrency training requirements for airline aircrews. Presently, 
to exercise flying privileges for an air carrier, pilots must be air-transport pilot (ATP) certificated [3] whereas for 
general aviation operations the majority of general aviation airmen [4] hold a private pilot (PPL) certificate. In 
this regard, greater precision in regard to both instrument flight (i.e. operating the aircraft by sole reference to 
flight instruments) [5, 6] and landing operations are demanded for the ATP certificate. Specifically for 
instrument flight, a one quarter versus a three quarter scale lateral deflection of the course deviation indicator 
is allowed for the ATP [5] and private pilot instrument ratings [6] respectively. Similarly landing operations have 
tighter tolerances for ATP certification (a 100 versus 200 foot margin for spot landings). Transport-category 
aircraft spot landings (to mitigate against the possibility of a runway overrun) require precise energy-
management [7, 8] due to greater landing distances required than a light aircraft.  Recurrency training for air 
carrier pilots is also more frequent and demanding compared with general aviation [9]. Crews have to 
undertake such training every 6 (Captain) or 12 months (first officer) whereas a flight review for general 
aviation airmen operating light aircraft for non-revenue is only required once every 24 months [10]. Moreover, 
recurrency programs for airline pilots are more extensive typically consisting of a multi-day program (comprised 
of maneuvers, abnormal procedures, upset recoveries and line-oriented flight training [9]). In contrast a flight 
review for a PPL requires only 1 hour of flight and tasks are at the sole discretion of the instructor “as 
necessary for safe flight” [10]. A second reason for the superior safety of the air carriers is the more stringent 
regulations (14CFR 121) [11] governing their operations (relative to the corresponding rules (14CFR 91) 
governing general aviation [12]) as well as the use of standard operating procedures [13] the latter absent from 
general aviation. For instance, whilst airport minimum visibility requirements apply to departing air carrier flights 
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(14CFR 121.637), no such restrictions limit general aviation (14CFR 91) operations [11]. Third, although not 
mandatory, many US carriers have adopted safety management systems (SMS) and threat and error 
management training per Federal Aviation Administration recommendations [14, 15]. Lastly, aircraft employed 
for air carrier operations are certificated (14CFR 25) to a higher safety standard [16] with a greater level of 
equipment redundancy than airplanes (14 CFR 23) [17] used in general aviation.     
 Nevertheless, for the airline pilot operating light aircraft under 14CFR 91, certain aspects of air carrier 
operations could potentially offset the safety-promoting factors cited above. For example, automation, more 
prevalent for transport-category aircraft, has raised concern as to the erosion of manual flying skills with one 
research study demonstrating degraded Boeing 747 pilot performance when tasked with manual flying [18]. In 
addition, the typical general aviation light aircraft requires more control inputs of the primary flight control 
surfaces for any given wind conditions than a much heavier transport-category airplane subjected to identical 
conditions. Lastly, virtually all transport-category aircraft employed by air-carriers require two person crews 
(14CFR 25 certification [16]) allowing for a prescriptive division of tasks for the pilot flying and pilot monitoring 
(14CFR 121.542-545 [11]). In contrast, the vast majority of light aircraft are operationally approved for, and 
piloted, by a single crew member [19] with an attendant increase in workload [19]  
 Thus, whether more rigorous airman certification/recurrency training/stringent operational rules for 
airline pilots translates into improved safety in the general aviation environment or conversely, whether lesser 
automation coupled with lighter aircraft performance (more subject to winds) offsets such safety benefits has 
yet to be determined. Accordingly, we undertook a study to determine the level of safety of airline pilots flying 
non-revenue, light aircraft in operational areas where their professional training/experience/regulations, as 
described above, would be expected to impact. Specifically, the following question was posed: are airline pilots 
superior to their instrument-rated private pilot (PPL-IFR) counterparts as evidenced by a reduced proportion of 
(i) accidents attributed to an in-flight loss-of-control in degraded visibility- an event [20] previously cited on the 
NTSB “Most Wanted List” [21] (ii) landing accidents ascribed to deficient pilot technique and (iii) mishaps 





MATERIALS AND METHODS 
Procedure 
 Accidents were identified from a retrospective search of the downloaded NTSB Microsoft Access 
database (2018 Oct release) [22] involving (i) airline pilots the latter defined as an ATP-certificated professional 
airman holding a Class 1 medical, a type rating in a transport-category aircraft (or employed by an air carrier) 
and 65 years or younger and (ii) as a control group, instrument-rated PPLs holding a Class 3 medical. It should 
be noted that  the PPL population was deliberately restricted to those airmen concurrently holding an IFR 
rating (hereafter referred to as PPL-IFR pilots) to afford a comparison for airman performance in degraded 
visibility - instrument flying proficiency representing a core element of the ATP certificate [5]. 
 The database was queried for accidents occurring over the period spanning 1998-2017 involving piston 
engine-powered airplanes (<12,500 lbs.) in which flights were conducted under general operating flight rules 
(14CFR 91 [12]) for personal missions. Accidents in Alaska were excluded from the query strategy. Data were 
exported to Excel and checked for duplicates (which were deleted). Accident causes were per the NTSB final 
report. Airline pilot type rating data was obtained from a variety of publicly available resources [23, 24] and by 
the FAA Office of Accident Investigation and Prevention. 
 High-energy landings were defined as those for which the NTSB final report cited porpoising, multiple 
bounces or floating of the accident airplane [25, 26]. Conversely, landings with inadequate airspeed (low-
energy) were those cited as such or for which an aerodynamic stall occurred above the runway again per the 
NTSB final report [25].  
 An anonymous online survey as to non-revenue, 14CFR 91 operations of light aircraft by PPL-IFR and 
airline pilots (approved by the Embry Riddle Aeronautical University Institutional Review Board) to inform flight 
times and ambient conditions was constructed in SurveyMonkeyR (www.surveymonkey.com) and pre-tested by 
four FAA Safety Team general aviation pilots as well as co-authors MS and DC. Responses from the airline 
and PPL-IFR pilot populations at large were collected over the period spanning Feb 14-April 05, 2020. 
Statistical Analysis 
 Proportion testing used contingency tables and a Pearson Chi-Square or Fisher’s Exact (2-sided) tests 
to determine where there were statistical differences [27, 28]. The contribution of individual cells in proportion 
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tests was determined using standardized residuals (Z-scores) in post-hoc testing. Differences in median values 
for non-normally distributed data (determined using a Shapiro Wilks test) were tested using a Mann-Whitney 
test. All statistical analyses were performed using SPSS (v24) software. 
RESULTS 
Accident Pilot Population 
 In the retrospective analysis, a query of the NTSB Access database for general aviation accidents in 
the USA involving light aircraft occurring over the period spanning 1998-2017 returned 124 and 934 airline and 
PPL-IFR pilots with median ages of 49 and 54 years respectively. These two airman cohorts had accrued a 
median total flight experience of 12,917 and 1,042 hours in all aircraft respectively. 
In-Flight Loss-of-Control Accidents in 
Degraded Visibility. 
  We argued, that with the greater 
precision required for instrument flight 
per ATP certification [5, 6] and an 
increased exposure to degraded 
visibility concomitant with their 
professional occupation a reduced 
proportion of in-flight loss-of-control 
accidents in such visibility would be 
evident for airline pilots. Herein, 
degraded visibility was operationally 
defined as less than visual flight rules 
(i.e. cloud ceiling of < 3000 feet (AGL)) and/or ambient night lighting [29].  
 While 27% of instrument-rated private pilot (PPL-IFR) accidents occurred in degraded visibility (Figure 
1), airline pilots showed a lower proportion (11%) of such mishaps, a difference which was statistically 
significant (χ2 p<0.001). Loss-of-control accidents often have a fatal outcome [30] and indeed, this cause was 
previously cited on the NTSB “most wanted” list [21]. Perhaps not surprisingly, 40% of fatal accidents in 
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degraded visibility involving PPL-IFR airmen were ascribed to this event (Figure 2). In contrast, for airline 
pilots, there were no accidents in degraded 
visibility attributed to in-flight loss-of-
control. Again, this difference in 
proportions between the two pilot groups 
was statistically significant (χ2 p=0.043).  
 To determine if this absence of in-
flight loss-of-control accidents incurred by 
airline pilots was due to diminished general 
aviation flying in degraded visibility, the air 
carrier and PPL-IFR pilot populations at 
large were, in a prospective online survey, 
queried for their flight times and 
environmental conditions whilst operating 
light aircraft under 14CFR 91. Of 913 respondents, 295 airline and 618 PPL-IFR airmen completed the survey 
(Table 1). While indeed, the latter airmen showed an approximately 3 fold increase in annual IMC/night flight 
times compared with air carrier pilots, this difference unlikely accounts for the complete lack of in-flight loss-of-
control accidents involving airline pilots operating in degraded visibility.  
Landing Accidents. 
 Landing a transport category aircraft requires a higher degree of precision than a comparable operation 
with a light aircraft due to the greater weight and physical dimensions. Specifically, a substantially higher 
weight (e.g. maximum landing weight of a Boeing 737-800 is 146,275 lbs. [31] 57 fold higher than that of a 
Cessna 172S (2,550 lbs.) [32]) necessitates a faster landing speed which must be closely adhered to in order 
to avoid a runway overrun. Likewise, the greater lateral spacing of the main landing gear wheels also demands 
precision in directional control of a transport-category aircraft after touchdown. In contrast, operating a light 
aircraft at the majority of US civil aviation airports [33] with their relatively long and wide runways allow for 
deficiencies in the aforementioned skills with a reduced risk of a runway excursion. To determine if the airline 
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pilot landing skillset transferred to the operations of light aircraft, landing accidents were compared for the two 
pilot cohorts.  
 Across all phases of 
flight operations, landing 
accidents were the most 
frequent for both airline and 
PPL-IFR pilots accounting for 
39% (n=22) and 27% (n=259) 
of mishaps, respectively. 
Although the elevated 
proportion for air carrier airmen 
relative to the PPL-IFR cohort 
was not statistically different 
(χ2 p=0.069), nevertheless, it 
contravenes the notion that 
landing proficiency skills in 
transport-category aircraft 
transfers to light aircraft 
operations.  
Table 1. Prospective Survey of Airline 
and PPL-IFR Pilots. 
 Results of an online survey 
conducted of the airline (Airline) and 
instrument-rated private (PPL-IFR) 
pilot population-at-large. Data were 
non-normally distributed per a Shapiro-Wilk test and accordingly differences in median values tested using a Mann-Whitney U Test. 
Proportion differences for landing gear type was tested using a Chi-Square test.  h, hours; Q, quartile. IMC, instrument meteorological 
conditions.  
 
Airline Pilots PPL-IFR P Value
n 295 618
Median (h) 53 60 <0.001
Q1 (h) 43 48
Q3 (h) 60 68
n 293 615
Median (h) 500 730 0.011
Q1 (h) 260 323
Q3 (h) 1350 1700
n 292 613
Median (h) 75 80 0.005
Q1 (h) 44 50
Q3 (h) 100 120
n 295 618
Median (h) 10 16 <0.001
Q1 (h) 5 9
Q3 (h) 20 30
n 295 618




Median (h) 2 7 <0.001
Q1 (h) 0 2
Q3 (h) 10 15
n 295 618
Median (h) 2 7 0.005
Q1 (h) 0 2
Q3 (h) 10 15
Tail-Wheel (n) 90 32
% 31 5
Nose-Wheel (n) 205 586
% 69 95
p<0.001
Annual Night Time (h) 
Light Aircraft Most 
Commonly Used
Age
Total Time Light Aircraft 
(h) Most Commonly Flown
Annual Light Aircraft Time 
(h) Airplane Most 
Frequently Flown 
Last 90 Days Flight Time 
(Make-Model)
Annual IMC Time (h) Light 
Aircraft Most Frequently 
Operated
Number of Flights in Light 
Aircraft Most Commonly 






 Landing accidents ascribed to deficiencies in pilot stick and rudder skills were then categorized as to 
cause. Airline pilots were superior to their PPL-IFR counterparts in energy management with zero landing 
mishaps ascribed to either excessive (High-energy Approach) or insufficient speed (Low-Energy Approach) 
(Figure 3). On the other hand, 
approximately 26% of landing 
mishaps by PPL-IFR airmen 
were due to a high-energy 
approach (defined as any in 
which the aircraft porpoised, 
floated or bounced multiple 
times) a difference which was 
statistically significant (χ2 
p=0.036).  
 Conversely, a higher 
(χ2 p=0.009) proportion of 
landing accidents which the 
NTSB binned into the “ground 
loss of directional control” 
category (0.92 vs. 0.53) was 
evident for airline pilots (Figure 3). This was unexpected as managing this vector component is more critical for 
a transport category aircraft with its substantially wider main wheel base compared with that of a light aircraft. 
We considered the possibility that this surprising finding was related to the type of aircraft landing gear. Tail-
wheel (conventional) and tricycle (nose) landing gear-equipped aircraft exhibit different handling characteristics 
and are well recognized as more challenging to maintain ground directional control particularly in a cross-wind 
[34]. Indeed, consistent with this argument, while over 70% of landing accidents involving air carrier pilots were 
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incurred with tail-wheel airplanes, this proportion was substantially lower (<30%) for such mishaps involving 
PPL-IFR airmen  (Figure 4). This difference in accident aircraft landing gear type was statistically significant for 
the two pilot cohorts (χ2 p<0.001). Presumably, the over-representation of this type of landing accident for 
airline pilots reflects their preference for such-equipped aircraft for general aviation operations (Table 1). It is 
worth noting that none of the ground loss of directional control accidents involving airline pilots in tail-wheel 
equipped airplanes 
was due to an 





Violation of FAA 
Regulations. 
 Airline 
operations are under 
strict vigilance for 
infringement of the FAA regulations via a variety of mechanisms including flight quality assurance programs 
[35] and audio recordings of the flight deck [11]. In contrast, little comparable oversight exists for general 
aviation. Moreover, airline pilots are well aware that infractions of the regulations leading to an incident or 
accident may culminate in the revocation of flying privileges and hence income. With these factors in mind, we 
hypothesized that a diminished fraction of FAA violation-related general aviation accidents would be evident for 
these airmen whilst operating light aircraft. 
 Contrary to expectations, the proportion of 14CFR 91 rules transgression-related mishaps by airline 
pilots, although low, was more than double (7 vs. 3% respectively) that for accidents involving PPL-IFR airmen. 
There was little evidence of a temporal trend in such accidents as 3 and 4 of mishaps involving an infraction of 
the FAA regulations occurred over the 1998-2007 and 2008-2017 periods respectively, The infractions of the 
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FAA regulations were then sub-categorized (Table 2). Interestingly, there was a disproportionate (χ2 p=0.021) 
number of violations involving airline pilots in which the light aircraft was 
 
Table 2. Categories of FAA Violations for Airline and PPL-IFR Pilots. 
 The count (n) and proportion (fraction) of accidents in which the NTSB cited the specified FAA violation is tabulated. P values 
were derived from adjusted residuals from a Fisher’s Exact Test. Wx, weather. 
 
operated below the legal minimum altitude -accounting for 57% of FAA rule infractions. In contrast, this 
subcategory accounted for 17% of all PPL-IFR accidents in which the FAA regulations were breached. 
Interestingly, the second most common (constituting 43% of all FAA transgressions) violation of the FAA 
regulations for accidents involving airline pilots was the “No Pre-Flight WX Briefing OR Intentional Flight 
Operations in Instrument Conditions.” However, in statistical testing, the proportions corresponding to this 
violation category for the two groups of accident pilots were comparable (p>0.005). 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 We show herein that, for general aviation operations, airline pilots show both safety improvements and 
deficits relative to PPL-IFR airmen. Regarding improvements the absence of in-flight loss-of-control accidents 
in degraded visibility was notable for airline pilots. Conversely, and initially surprising, these airmen were more 
likely to experience a ground loss of directional control during the landing roll. Finally, in regard to violations of 
the FAA regulations, despite the regimented nature of air carrier operations, airline pilots showed a greater 
proclivity for disregarding the minimum altitudes prescribed by 14CFR 91.    
 The safety of the airline pilots operating in degraded visibility, as witnessed by an absence of any in-
flight loss-of-control accidents, merits some discussion especially since such mishaps under corresponding 
FAA Violation Count (n) Fraction Count (n) Fraction Pvalue
Disqualifying Medical Condition/Use of Illegal Drugs 0 0.00 4 0.10 >0.05
Intentional Visual Flight Departure into Instrument 
Conditions OR No Pre-Flight WX Briefing 3 0.43 22 0.54 >0.05
Lack of IFR Currency 0 0.00 2 0.05 >0.05
Maneuvering Flight below Legal Minimum Altitude 4 0.57 7 0.17 0.021
Un-Airworthy aircraft 0 0.00 6 0.15 >0.05
>0.05




conditions in the general aviation sector are frequent and moreover carry a high fatality rate [30]. Certainly, 
these professional airmen have a high exposure to such weather conditions as part of their professional 
occupation. In contrast PPL-IFR pilots eschew operating in such weather [36] and struggle to maintain 
currency to legally operate in instrument conditions [37]. Nevertheless, transport-category aircraft are highly 
automated and there is current debate as to whether such automation adversely affects stick-and-rudder skills. 
Indeed, in a study of Boeing 747 aircraft pilots tasked with performing an instrument approach in which aircraft 
automation was progressively degraded [18], 44% were in error in identifying the missed approach fix and 16% 
descended below the minimum altitudes prescribed by the approach chart. How then do these findings 
reconcile with the stellar performance of airline pilots operating light aircraft with less automation [36] in 
degraded visibility in the general aviation environment? We suspect that a combination of increased 
experience operating transport-category aircraft under such conditions and ATP certification [38, 39] 
demanding a higher level of proficiency in instrument flight (relative to the IFR rating held by PPL airmen) more 
than offset any decrements caused by frequent automation usage.  
 The sub-classification of landing accidents related to pilot technique informs performance deficiencies 
for both the PPL-IFR and airline pilot cohorts. Indeed, the preponderance of landing accidents caused by poor 
landing speed control (mainly high-energy) for the former airmen contrasting with the absence of such mishaps 
for the latter pilots is noteworthy. Our findings are congruent with those of prior studies [25, 26] reporting on the 
tendency of general aviation pilots to carry excessive landing speeds (higher than V-Ref –airplane speed in the 
landing configuration, at the point where it descends through the 50 ft. height) [40]. Such a practice with 
transport category aircraft would lead to an abundance of runway overruns and air carrier pilots must adhere 
closely to the approach speed regimen. On the other hand, airline pilots relative to their PPL-IFR counterparts 
showed a greater deficiency in maintaining ground directional control during the landing roll. We argue that 
several reasons likely underlie this observation. First, airline pilots accrued a lower amount of time-in-type as 
evident from both a prospective survey of the airline pilot population-at-large as well as that for the accident 
airmen (median make-model flight times-132 and 261 hours for airline and PPL-IFR respectively). Second, 
compared with operating a transport category aircraft, light aircraft demand more control inputs for identical 
landing wind conditions. Third, and likely most important, is the preference of airline pilots for operating light 
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aircraft with tail-wheel landing gear (conventional undercarriage). It is well established that such airplanes 
show ground handling characteristics at variance with tricycle aircraft [41]. Specifically, conventional aircraft 
are inherently unstable on the ground and exhibit an exaggerated tendency to weathervane during ground 
operations in a cross-wind [41]. In regard to this latter point, we considered the possibility that the involved 
conventional under-carriage aircraft had unique ground handling characteristics based on (i) being of 
experimental build or (ii) less rigorous certification standards in effect for older aircraft. However, these 
arguments are unlikely for two reasons. First none of the ground loss of directional control mishaps involved 
experimental (i.e. non-certificated) aircraft. Second, whilst indeed the involved aircraft were of older vintage 
and subject to earlier certification regulations (i.e. civil air regulations-CARs [42]), such standards with respect 
to ground handling were identical to those promulgated for later aircraft certification per 14CFR 23.231-233 
[43] effective up to 2017. 
 Surprisingly, airline pilots involved in accidents did not show greater compliance with the FAA 
regulations than PPL-IFR airmen. For this accident category, more than half of mishaps were due to these 
airmen operating the aircraft below the minimum altitudes prescribed by 14CFR 91.119 (500 and 1,000 feet 
above ground for other-than-congested and congested areas respectively) [12]. Why is this? One must 
consider that airline operations are all conducted under IFR rules requiring adherence to minimum altitudes 
defined by jet routes, standard arrivals and departures [44] absent for VFR operations. Whether airline pilots 
were unfamiliar with the minimum altitudes for VFR operations per 14CFR 91 [12] or were deliberately 
operating contrary to such regulations is currently unknown. Based on anecdotal information we suspect the 
former. Thus, for three of the four minimum altitude infractions, in their NTSB statements one pilot admitted to 
flying “ along a creek” another, “through a valley” with the third airman stating descending to what he ”thought 
was a safe VFR altitude.” Notably, none of these accidents were due to degraded visibility ruling out “scud-
running” as a causal factor. Another question raised by this infraction relates to the role of surveillance evident 
in the airline industry but absent from general aviation. Consequently, general aviation pilots may be tempted 
to infringe such minimum altitudes with immunity nevertheless developing a greater skillset with respect to 
operating below legal minimum altitudes. 
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 Also noteworthy was the disregard by airline pilots for the FAA regulations necessitating preflight 
weather briefings and intentional flight into instrument conditions. We entertain the possibility that the former 
transgression relates to the role of the airline dispatcher in preparation of a weather briefing for their pilots. It 
may be that (i) the airline pilot is so habituated to receiving this prepared material that such a task is 
overlooked for general aviation and/or (ii) he/she may be unaware of the tools to obtain a weather brief via 
official sources typically used by the general aviation pilot. 
 Although our research is the first to report on airline pilot safety in general aviation, an older study of 
accidents spanning the 1973-1983 period merits discussion [45]. The authors of that report noted that most 
ATP-certificated pilot accidents were due to aerobatics whereas, in the current study, aerobatics was cited for 
a single airline pilot accident. Moreover, only 4% of the airline pilot population-at-large survey respondents 
indicated this as the primary purpose of their general aviation flights. How can the differences in the results 
between the two studies be reconciled? A key difference in study design is pertinent. Specifically, the Salvatore 
and co-author study was not limited to airline pilots per their two inclusion criteria: (i) ATP-certificated and (ii) a 
self-description as a “professional pilot.” Thus, the cohort would also include pilots engaged in charter 
operations (14CFR 135), corporate flying and other non-air carrier professions with corresponding lower levels 
of training/recurrency/oversight. In addition, much has changed in general aviation over the intervening three 
decades in regard to technology such as in-flight data-linked weather and in the case of general aviation 
scenario-based training [46]. 
 Our study was not without limitations. First, the absence of denominator data for both pilot cohorts 
operating under 14CFR 91 regulations precluded the determination of accident rates. Second, the count of 
airline pilot accidents was, in some cases, small. Third, risk exposure was determined in a prospective study 
with accident data obtained in a retrospective query. Fourth, type rating data, used as one of the criteria to 
operationally define an airline pilot, was in some instances based on information current at the time (2019-
2020) over which the research was conducted. As a result, for a subset of non-fatal accident pilots, a type 
rating may have been achieved after the mishap. Fifth, we accept that the multiple criteria used concurrently 
(ATP certification, a Class 1 Medical and type rating in a transport category aircraft) to operationally define an 
airline pilot  might also lead to the inclusion of a few airmen who do not fly for an air carrier. Finally, (and not 
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addressed in the current study) it would be of particular interest in a future survey to determine how airline and 
PPL-IFR pilots’ views compare with respect to safe operations of a light aircraft. In a similar vein, endeavors to 
capture accident pilot attitudes in NTSB reports with respect to “thrill-seeking” in an environment absent for 
surveillance are lacking.  
 Although the objective of the current study was to determine the safety of airline pilots in the general 
aviation environment, the findings inform performance deficiencies for both these and PPL-IFR pilots which 
warrant redress. Notably, regarding the preponderance of in-flight loss-of-control fatal accidents involving PPL-
IFR pilots, such airman would be well served by increasing the frequency of recovery from unusual attitudes 
maneuvers by reference to instruments in recurrency training. Moreover, for airmen with deficient IFR 
proficiency skills, safety could be improved by development of computer-based training systems which provide 
pilots with skills to recognize cues (e.g. cloud bases, visibility, darkening) associated with impending IMC as 
reported elsewhere [47]. The wide availability of advanced aviation training devices should make for a cost-
effective means of achieving/maintaining such proficiency. PPL-IFR safety would also benefit from an 
increased emphasis on landing energy/speed management in training/recurrency. As to airline pilot safety, 
airmen seeking to operate a light aircraft with tail-wheel landing gear should consider, post tail-wheel 
endorsement, additional dual time with an instructor (well experienced in conventional landing gear operations) 
focusing on landing/ground operations particularly under crosswind conditions. This recommendation would be 
on par with the initial operating experience required (14CFR 121.913) for airline pilots [11]. Finally, it would 
behoove airline pilots to adhere more closely (and if necessary familiarize themselves with) to 14CFR 91 
regulations pertinent to general aviation operations (in particular minimum altitudes) towards improving their 
safety whilst operating light aircraft. 
PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS 
 For PPL-IFR airmen, training/recurrency should focus on unusual attitude recovery and managing 
approach speeds. Airline pilots should seek additional instructional time regarding landing tail-wheel aircraft 
and become familiar with 14CFR 91 rules covering minimum altitudes. Lastly, future accident reporting should 
seek to capture airline pilot attitudes in the “overconfidence/misplaced motivation” nano-codes in the 
15 
 
Preconditions for Unsafe Acts/Adverse Mental States domain per the established Human Factor Classification 
System [48, 49]. 
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